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ABSTRACT

What exactly is a genetic disease? For a phrase one hears on a daily basis, there has
been surprisingly little analysis of the underlying concept. Medical doctors seem
perfectly willing to admit that the etiology of disease is typically complex, with a great
many factors interacting to bring about a given condition. On such a view, descriptions
of diseases like cancer as genetic seem at best highly simplistic, and at worst
philosophically indefensible. On the other hand, there is clearly some practical value to
be had by classifying diseases according to their predominant cause when this can be
accomplished in a theoretically satisfactory manner. The question therefore becomes
exactly how one should go about selecting a single causal factor among many to explain
the presence of disease. When an attempt to defend such causal selection is made at all,
the standard accounts offered (Koch’s postulates, Hill’s epidemiological criteria,
manipulability) are all clearly inadequate. I propose, however, an epidemiological
account of disease causation which walks the fine line between practical applicability and
theoretical considerations of causal complexity and attempts to compromise between
patient-centered and population-centered concepts of disease. The epidemiological
account is the most basic framework consistent with our strongly held intuitions about the
causal classification of disease, yet it avoids the difficulties encountered by its
competitors.
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I. Casual Selection and Causal Pessimism
“For every complex problem, there is a simple, easy to understand, incorrect answer.”
- Albert Szent-Gyorgyi
There is a crucial distinction that must be drawn between two related problems in
causal analysis. Germond Hesslow (1983, 1984, 1988) does this admirably well in his
discussion of causal connection vs. causal selection. The problem of causal connection is
the problem of determining which factors in a complex set, many of which may be
correlated to the outcome, are actually causes of the outcome. It is this question that
takes up the bulk of the scientist’s attention, and for obvious reasons. For example, the
current debate over whether one’s intake of dietary salt increases the risks of coronary
disease is a debate about whether and to what extent salt is actually a causal factor (as
opposed to merely a correlationally attractive bystander) in the disease etiology.
Casual selection is a fundamentally different problem, however. Causal selection
involves identifying which factor(s), among those known to be causally involved in a
particular outcome, to cite as explaining that outcome. In complex causal situations
(which are particularly common in medicine), we simply can not, for practical reasons,
cite the entire causal matrix as the appropriate explanation i. For example, we would tend
to cite the application of a burning match to a pile of hay as the cause of a barn fire,
without meaning to imply that other factors (presence of oxygen, absence of large
quantities of water, etc.) were not also causally involved ii. Causal factors other than the
one selected (presence of oxygen, etc.) are typically referred to as causal conditions (or,
derogatorily, as mere conditions).

3

A Disease by any other Name…

Most human diseases have a highly complex etiology, involving as they do causal
factors at all levels: genetic, physiological, systemic, psychological, social, etc. It is thus
understandable that, as long as questions of causal connection remain unanswered,
considerable effort is expended in an attempt to further elucidate the causal matrix. What
we must keep firmly in mind, however, is that describing a disease simply in terms of its
etiology is answering a fundamentally different question than that of causal selection.
This becomes clear once we realize that, even if all causal connection problems were
answered once and for all, causal selection problems would remain. This is because what
we regard as an appropriate explanation has a pragmatic component that is not captured
in causal connection analysis.
Allow me to illustrate this point with a hypothetical example. Suppose an alien
physician were to examine a human hospital patient. Suppose further that the alien’s
technology is so advanced that he is able to determine the precise causal sequence leading
to that particular patient’s cancer. The alien has thus completely solved the causal
connection problem and could, at least in principle, draw a causal map of the
development of cancer accurate down to the subatomic level. If you were to ask the
alien, “What caused the cancer?” he might simply point to the causal diagram. However,
this is unlikely to satisfy us because we are not asking for an exhaustive list of causal
connections, but for some selection as to which of those factors we should cite as being
most explanatory.
The alien might be able to satisfy this desire for explanation if some causal factor were
either necessary or sufficient for the development of the cancer. For example, if
everyone with a particular gene developed this cancer, the gene would be an obvious

4

A Disease by any other Name…

choice for causal selection and we could legitimately call this a genetic disease in that
sense. We could also select in a relatively straightforward fashion if nobody without
some (non-universal) environmental influence developed the cancer. For example, if
nobody developed the cancer unless they drank large amounts of cranberry juice – in
which case, we might label it an environmental disease. However, there are two basic
problems here. First, note that the examples above require information about populations
of humans. It would not be possible for the alien physician to judge the necessity or
sufficiency of the causal factors present in this isolated case without knowing a great deal
more about humans than he could reasonably derive from a single patient. Second, given
what we know about diseases like cancer, it seems highly unlikely that there will be such
a neat identification of sufficient and/or necessary conditions, since the causal matrices
are just too complex.
The two philosophers to think most clearly about this problem were J.S. Mill and J.L.
Mackie, both of whom ultimately expressed pessimism about the possibility of nonarbitrary causal selection. Mill (1859) points out that, rather than simple necessary or
sufficient conditions, what one typically finds are sets of conditions, the components of
which are sufficient only when considered jointly, with the set itself being nonnecessary iii. For example, the fire in the barn is the result of a great many factors such as
the application of burning match to hay, absence of water, presence of oxygen, etc. –
none of which would bring about a fire by themselves (i.e., they are individually
insufficient). On the other hand, there are an infinite number of such sets which could
bring about a fire in the barn – we might apply white phosphorous to the wall or suddenly
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increase the air pressure 100,000,000 fold, for example. Therefore, the particular set of
factors in any case, while (jointly) sufficient, is not necessary.
Mill sympathizes with the desire to causally select one factor over another in such
situations, but feels such exercises are ultimately arbitrary:
“The real cause is the whole of these antecedents; and we have, philosophically
speaking, no right to give the name of cause to one of them exclusively of the
others…Nothing can better show the absence of any scientific ground for the
distinction between the cause of a phenomenon and its conditions, than the
capricious manner in which we choose to denominate the cause.” (Mill 1859, pp
214-215)
Given that most diseases are causally complex, this problem is inescapable when
classifying diseases in terms of their etiology, as modern medicine so often does iv. The
fact of the matter is that much of importance hinges on the causal classification of a
disease: social acceptability, funding for research, etc. If such classifications really are
fundamentally arbitrary, then we have much to correct.

II. Simplistic Methods of Causal Selection
“He who would do away with philosophy is the slave of the worst philosophy.”
- Fredrich Engels
Ultimately, some of what we mean to capture by classifying diseases as genetic can be
salvaged. However, people tend to think about causal selection, when they think about it
at all, in highly simplistic terms v. In particular, there are three popular approaches which
are used in an attempt to settle the causal selection problem in this context, all of which
are inadequate.
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Perhaps the most common, but also certainly the most hopelessly flawed of these
techniques, holds that we are justified in claiming a disease is genetic, provided that
genes are causally involved. This might be a defensible claim, as we will see, if the
analysis went further than this to discuss what kind involvement there is and why it is the
most important aspect of the explanation of the disease. However, the typical conclusion
of a medical genetics paper does not even begin to consider such things. The recent
literature is thus rife with examples of researchers claiming that, because there is good
evidence of genetic involvement, the disease is now known to be genetic vi. Little more
needs to be said to show the absurdity of this than to point out that any disease
whatsoever can be classified as genetic on these grounds. All disease must involve,
directly or indirectly, genes – if nothing else, genes code for the proteins which make all
of biology possible. Even something so obviously non-genetic as lead poisoning, for
example, could be called genetic in the sense that some people are likely to have more
efficient (gene-based) mechanisms for handling high lead levels and thus will tend not to
get the condition when others around them do, etc. We could, with equal justification,
argue that all such disease should be classified as protein based, since all disease must
also involve proteins. Clearly, this kind of analysis does nothing to illuminate the causal
situation.
The second approach was first systematically developed by Robert Koch in his set of
three key postulates. Since these postulates have done much to shape the current thinking
about medical causation, they warrant close examination. Koch argues that we are
justified in saying a particular pathogen causes a particular disease whenever three basic
conditions are met:
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1) The pathogen is always found in individuals with the disease.
2) The pathogen is never found in individuals with conditions other than the
disease.
3) The pathogen always produces the disease when introduced into healthy
individuals.
Note that postulate #1 is simply a requirement that the pathogen is necessary, while
postulates #2 and #3 are requirements that it also be sufficient vii. It is certainly true that
these postulates served Koch and others well in the early field work for which they
became famous. The pathogenic diseases Koch studied are probably uniquely suited to
this type of analysis, involving as they do a clearly identifiable infectious agent with
well-defined and dramatic onset of a stereotypical set of symptoms. But even for
infectious diseases, these postulates are, strictly speaking, too strong. For example, many
people are infected with the TB bacillus yet never exhibit the disease, but we do not
conclude that TB is not caused by the bacillus viii. In any event, infectious diseases are
not representative of disease in general and genetic disease in particular.
Consider the case of Cystic Fibrosis, often put forward as a classic example of a genetic
disease. As the story is typically told, Cystic Fibrosis is caused by any of several hundred
known mutations in the Cystic Fibrosis Transmembrane Receptor (CFTR). Given this
account, one might reasonably expect that having a CFTR mutation will lead to CF and,
conversely, that lacking a CFTR mutation prevents CF. As often happens in such cases,
however, the actual clinical picture that emerges is much more complex:

INSERT TABLE 1
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If we apply Koch’s postulates to the case of CF, we see the following pattern:
1) Is the genetic anomaly always found in individuals with the disease?

NO

2) Is the genetic anomaly never found in individuals with other conditions? NO
3) Does the genetic anomaly always produce the disease in otherwise healthy
individuals?

NO

According to Koch, therefore, there is no reason to describe CF as a genetic disease –
despite the fact that we have a relatively good idea of its etiology and have excellent
reason to believe that a gene is a crucial causal player.
There are also epidemiological criteria which are essentially more complex versions of
Koch’s postulates. Sir Austin Hill’s analysis lists eight different criteria which should be
considered:

1) Strength: The correlation between the causal factor and the disease should be
strong.
2) Consistency: The correlation between causal factor and disease should be
observed under varying conditions/individuals.
3) Specificity: The causal factor should be correlated only, or most strongly, with
the disease.
4) Temporality: The causal factor should precede the disease in temporal sequence.
5) Biological gradient: The disease should exhibit a dose response curve for the
causal factor.
6) Plausibility: There should be a plausible causal story as to how the factor causes
the disease.
7) Coherence: The causal story about the factor and disease must cohere with other
knowledge we have about other causal factors, etc.
8) Analogy: Similar causal factors should cause similar diseases.
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This is undeniably an improvement over Koch’s original formulation, since it allows
for a much more nuanced description of the causal relationship between a particular
factor and the disease. However, this is also something of a drawback: where Koch’s
postulates will usually yield a clear (if sometimes misleading) answer, Hill’s criteria will
often not yield much of an answer at all (though they will not as frequently mislead). For
example, Hill provides no clear method of ranking or weighting the various factors.
Thus, it is relatively mysterious what we are to make of a putative causal agent which
scores well on one criterion and poorly on another. When we examine the suitability of a
genetic explanation for CF, we get something like the following pattern:
1) Strength

Unknown ix

2) Consistency

No

3) Specificity:

No

4) Temporality:

Yes

5) Biological gradient

Possibly

6) Plausibility

Yes

7) Coherence

Yes

8) Analogy:

Unknown

With three fairly positive indicators, two negative and three uncertain, perhaps one
could make a better case on Hill’s criteria than on Koch’s postulates that CF is actually a
genetic disease. Hill’s account remains disturbingly vague, however.

III. Manipulability
“A little inaccuracy saves a world of explanation.” - C.E. Ayers
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There are actually a wide variety of techniques that have been developed to make sense
of causal selection x. However, the one most pertinent by far to the question of genetic
disease is manipulability. The manipulability criterion says that a disease is genetic if
and only if it is best controlled (prevented) through manipulation of the genes. This has
an obvious appeal for medicine - since the physician’s primary interest is in preventing
disease, he is likely to advocate (at least implicitly) a manipulability criterion. The basic
problem here is that the intuitive appeal of manipulability, like that of Hill’s criteria, has
been purchased at the price of clarity.
There are two main sorts of ambiguity here. The first concerns how we are to interpret
the phrase “best controlled”. That is, what exactly makes one form of manipulation
better than another? Perhaps if one technique is cheaper, less invasive, more permanent,
and easier to employ, this will not be a difficult decision. However, how often will the
choice actually be this clear? It seems at least plausible, perhaps likely, that within 50
years we will have developed the technology to alter the somatic genes of CF patients
and restore them to something like normal health. However, this treatment is likely to be
expensive and may carry significant risks. Would the gene therapy be a better
manipulation than second generation DNase inhalers, a cheap and effective (if
impermanent) treatment? This seems like the kind of decision we would want to let the
patient make himself, based on his own personal preferences. Our instincts lead us in
this direction precisely because it is very unclear how to decide which treatment is in fact
best, or even if there is an objective best. If we leave the decision to each patient while
maintaining the manipulability criterion, however, CF becomes a genetic disease for
patients who prefer the gene therapy and a non-genetic disease for those preferring the
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inhaler. This seems a very odd sort of relativity to introduce into our causal classification
of a disease.
The second point of ambiguity concerns what kind of manipulability we have in mind.
When people speak of manipulability, they are rarely clear as to whether they mean
manipulability in practice or manipulability in principle. Either way, there are
difficulties. Suppose we mean manipulability in practice – a disease is genetic if there
are or very soon will be effective genetic interventions for individuals with the disease.
We would all like to believe that such treatments are just around the corner, but is there
really any compelling evidence to this effect? To date, no somatic gene therapy has been
successfully vetted in a clinical trial xi. Moreover, there are several serious technical
difficulties that will have to be resolved before the treatment becomes the standard of
care (e.g., targeting all and only the desired cells, etc.). Of course, we might be willing to
endorse selective breeding or genetic engineering, where permanent alterations are made
to the germ line of the population. This would be more tractable from a purely technical
point of view (we have bred agricultural organisms for thousands of years), but these
techniques still are not really practical because they have been rejected by all virtually
all modern countries for compelling ethical reasons. In such a case, the cure literally
seems worse than the disease. At the moment, therefore, there are very poor grounds for
describing any disease as genetic on the basis of it manipulability in practice. If what we
mean by a genetic disease is that it is genetically manipulable in practice, then we will
have to refrain from describing any diseases as genetic for a long time to come.
Perhaps what we really mean then is manipulability in principle – the question is thus
not whether a genetic intervention is feasible now or in the near future, but whether one is
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possible on some sort of theoretical grounds. One difficulty that arises immediately is
this: what theoretical grounds are we talking about? Since manipulability in practice is
something we do not currently have the technology to pull off, the theoretical grounds for
a claim of manipulability in practice will have to be very general and vague. I would be
willing to admit that, given sufficiently advanced technology, any disease is in principle
subject to genetic manipulation. Our hypothetical alien physician, for example, would
certainly be able to treat the human cancer patient via genetic intervention, should he
choose to do so.
Notice what happens when we make this move, however. First, we are now talking
about science fiction, which destroys the original reason physicians favor manipulability:
its emphasis on the practical aspects of patient care. Second, with a completely
unqualified notion of technological progress, we again run the risk of classifying all
disease as genetic. One does hear this claim occasionally from medical researchers, but
if all disease is genetic, then the description of a disease as genetic is trivially true. We
could, with equal depth of insight, note that all disease is protein-based.
Finally, even if we are willing to take a very optimistic view of technology and discuss
manipulability only in principle, then any given disease could just as easily be described
as environmental - the alien physician is also certain to be able to intervene in the
patient’s cancer by using environmental rather than genetic factors. In fact, it is quite
common for putatively genetic diseases to be more amenable to environmental
manipulation. Thus, phenylketonuria (PKU) is genetic in principle – it is associated with
a defective gene that may one day be repairable. However, there are already dietary
interventions that can prevent or mitigate the symptoms and there will likely be more
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effective and less intrusive treatments developed along these lines in the future (perhaps a
pill containing the missing enzyme so that patients could again ingest phenylalanine,
etc.). I grant that this may seem a bit far fetched at the moment, but that is precisely the
point.
Manipulability in practice seems to involve either extremely dubious levels of genetic
optimism or a willingness to engage in dangerous and far reaching social
experimentation. Manipulability in principle seems nothing more than a license to dream
about what may come along at some point in the future and is so vague as to produce
analyses that are both trivial and non-exclusive. In either case, the original motivation for
the manipulability criterion – that it meets the clinical concerns of the physician in a
practical fashion – disappears altogether.

IV. The Epidemiological Account
“Metaphysics is nothing more than an extremely obstinate effort to think clearly.”
– William James
There must be a way to satisfy both our practical need for disease classification and our
theoretical need to do justice to the complexities of causal systems in biology. There
must be a causal analysis which captures both the practically-minded focus on individual
patients and the necessary elements of population thinking. The proper system would be
as clearly decidable as Koch’s postulates, but allow for the kind of causal complexity
incorporated in Hill’s criteria. This system will certainly not be able to classify all human
disease, indeed it may fail to clearly classify most human disease, given the complex
causal system the human body is. However, such an account would still represent a solid
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foundation on which to build. The epidemiological account of disease is an attempt to
meet this challenge.
In order to avoid as many difficulties as possible, I set myself a relatively modest goal:
I want to provide an account of disease causation which is minimally adequate – I make
no pretense that this account can not be greatly improved or even that different versions
of it may not be appropriate for answering different kinds of questions.

I must also

make it clear that my goal is primarily to present a normative account of how the phrase
“genetic disease” should be used, rather than a descriptive account of how it is actually
used. To be sure, a careful description and categorization of the various uses would be an
interesting project, but it is not mine at present. Of course, there is a fine line here - I
have no wish to develop a disease concept that is so far from common practice that
nobody will ever use it. On the other hand, I do not want to adopt uses of the term which
are incompatible or theoretically indefensible.
My epidemiological account is thus designed to satisfy the two most basic and widely
held intuitions about disease causation as simply as possible:
1) If a disease is genetic, this must mean that those with the gene are more likely
than not to develop the disease xii. We might call this the bottom-up or
individual causal viewpoint.
2) If a disease is genetic, this must mean that most cases of disease in the
population are caused by the gene. We might call this the top-down, or
populational causal viewpoint.
These seem entirely unexceptionable intuitions that any adequate account of causal
selection will have to incorporate. How could a disease be said to be genetic if those with
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the gene are not (in some sense) likely to develop the disease? How could a disease be
genetic if most people who are its victims do not have the gene in question? I thus treat
these intuitions as primitive and in need of no further support.
I call my account the epidemiological account because it draws its inspiration from the
field of epidemiology. Like epidemiology, it is an analysis of disease that crucially
depends on statistical methods applied to populations rather than individuals. It is unlike
epidemiology, however, in one crucial particular: while epidemiologists invest a great
deal of their effort in finding causes to associate with disease (solving the causal
connection problem), my concern is in the explanation of disease (solving the causal
selection problem) on the assumption that we have already distinguished causes from
conditions xiii. To be sure, answering the causal selection question depends crucially on
accurate information concerning causal connection. I do not want to appear to
underestimate the complexity of this task, but the methods and problems of causal
connection analysis have been and will continue to be discussed quite widely in the
literature and thus are not the focus of this paper.
Epidemiology is an examination of the properties of populations and thus it is crucial
at the outset to specify a well-defined population to which the analysis will apply xiv. As
we will see, extremely counterintuitive results will be produced if we are unclear or
waffle concerning the population to which the analysis applies. Once we have clearly
delineated our population and drawn up our list of causal factors, there are a great many
questions one might ask. For our purposes, however, there are four which are most
crucial xv:

16

A Disease by any other Name…

1) The Global Question (for the entire population): What is the probability that those
who have the gene will contract or have contracted the disease because of that
gene?
2) The Diagnostic Question (for someone with both the disease and the gene): What
is the probability that the disease was caused by the gene?
3) The Testing Question (for someone with the disease): What is the probability that
the disease was caused by the gene?
4) The Prognosis Question (for someone who has the gene): What is the probability
that this will cause the disease?
Let’s turn to a particular case to develop the analysis we will need to answer each of
these questions. Suppose we look carefully at a population of 10,000 people where
12.5% (1250) have a particular disease and 10% (1000) have a gene thought to cause that
disease because 80% (800) of those with the gene develop the disease. We then gather
the following data about the distribution of the disease and its associated gene:

INSERT TABLE 2

Unfortunately, this table is not accurate enough to answer our questions precisely. This
is because some people who do not have the gene nevertheless develop the disease, due
to the involvement of other causal factors. Therefore, some of the people who have the
gene will develop the disease, not because of the gene, but because of these other factors.
Thus, we must distinguish between cases where people have the gene and it causes them
to have the disease and those where people have the gene and develop the disease for
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other reasons. If we assume that the gene and these other factors act independently, then
we can say that approximately the same percentage of gene carriers will develop the
disease for other reasons as those in the general population without the gene but with the
disease (450/9000 = 5%). We can then move on to the more accurate Table 3:

INSERT TABLE 3

With this correction, we are now in a position to answer, for this population, the
original four questions posed:

1) The Global Question (for the entire population): What is the probability that those who
have the gene will contract or have contracted the disease because of that gene?
This would simply be the number of individuals whose disease was caused by the gene
divided by the size of the entire population (760/10,000 = 7.6%). This would tell us how
large a problem the gene is causing in the population and thus, by extension, what could
potentially be fixed by genetic manipulation. It does not really tell us anything
interesting about whether the disease is genetic, however. We certainly would not want
to say, for example, that rare diseases can not be considered genetic (in fact, most
paradigm examples of genetic disease are quite rare).

2) The Diagnostic Question (for someone with both the disease and the gene): What is
the probability that the disease was caused by the gene?
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This may be called the Simple Etiologic Fraction (SEF), which in this case would be
the number of people whose disease was caused by the gene divided by the total number
of people with the gene and the disease (760/800 = 95%). This would tell us how likely
it is that a particular patient with the gene will develop a disease because of those genes
or, if he already has the disease (and the gene), how likely it is that the condition was
caused by the genes. It also indicates what percentage of the population with the gene
might potentially be impacted by genetic manipulation to prevent disease.
It is tempting to view a high SEF (above 50%) as an indication that the disease is in fact
genetic. However, we are tempted not because of what SEF actually indicates as what
we might think it indicates. It does not really interest us to know that, in individuals with
both the gene and the disease, the gene is or is not usually the causal factor responsible
(which is what SEF actually reveals). It would interest us to know that the gene is
usually the causal factor amongst those with the disease in general, since this would
allow us to discover whether the populational causal intuition was met. But this is not
what SEF tells us and we can not derive that information from SEF (for this we need to
answer the testing question). Simply put, SEF tells us nothing about the percentage of
diseased individuals who owe their suffering to their genes. To do that, it would have to
incorporate information about individuals with the disease, but who lack the gene (which
it does not).
Similarly, SEF tells us nothing at all about the likelihood of developing the disease,
given the gene (and thus can not answer the prognosis question). We need this
information to decide if the individual causal intuition is met. In order to do that,
however, SEF would have to factor in information about people with the gene, but who

19

A Disease by any other Name…

remain disease-free (which it does not). Tempting as it might appear on first
examination, SEF is pretty useless in answering the causal selection problem.

3) The Testing Question (for someone with the disease): What is the probability the
disease was caused by the gene?
This is asking for what epidemiologists call the Population Etiologic Fraction (PEF).
In this case, it would be the number of individuals whose disease was caused by the
genes, divided by the total number of diseased individuals (760/1250 = 61%). This does
seem to be getting at something important in our concept of disease intuition. In
particular, as long as the PEF > 50%, we know that most cases of disease in the
population are in fact caused by the genes. This is precisely the requirement of the
populational causal intuition, so it seems we need a stipulation in our concept of genetic
disease that the PEF > 50%. We might be tempted to stop here and say that this is the
only criterion for genetic status. However, although a high PEF insures that the
populational intuition is met, it does not assure us with respect to the individual intuition.
Consider the following variation on our original case:

INSERT TABLE 4

Here, although it is quite true that most cases of disease in the population are caused by
the genes (PEF > 50%), the gene does not cause most people to develop the disease. This
violates our individual causal intuition and thus PEF needs to be supplemented as a
concept of genetic disease.
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4) The Prognosis Question (for someone who has the gene): What is the probability that
this will cause the disease?
Here we are asking for what epidemiologist call Attributable Risk (AR). In original
case from Table 3, we calculate AR by dividing the number of people whose disease was
caused by the gene by the total number of people with the gene (760/1000 = 76%).
Again, this does seem to be getting at something important in our concept of disease
intuition. As long as the AR > 50%, we know that the gene will cause most of its carriers
to develop the disease. This meets the requirement of the individual causal intuition, and
thus we must also stipulate in out general account of disease that the AR > 50%. Note,
however, that just as a high PEF (answering the populational causal intuition) does not
guarantee a high AR, so a high AR (answering the individual causal intuition) does not
guarantee a high PEF. Consider the following case:

INSERT TABLE 5

Here, although it is quite true that, in most cases, the disease genes cause the disease
(AR > 50%), it is equally true that most cases of disease are not caused by the gene (PEF
< 50%). This violates our populational causal intuition and thus we can not use the AR
criterion alone.
We can now get down to the business of applying the epidemiological concepts. Given
the epidemiological outlook, what exactly constitutes a genetic disease? Clearly, it must
involve both PEF and AR, on pain of giving up one of our original intuitions. It remains
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an open issue, however, how strongly these should be interpreted. One obvious possible
answer would be to say that a disease is genetic whenever it is “practically sufficient”
within a given population xvi:
Practically Sufficient (PS): A disease is genetic whenever the gene’s
Attributable Risk AND Population Etiologic Fraction are both 100% xvii. In plain
English, this means that everyone with the gene has the disease because of that
gene AND no one with the disease has the disease because of anything other than
the gene.
This accords nicely with our intuitions that being a genetic disease has something
important to do with sufficiency and necessity. On the other hand, PS does not make the
mistake of claiming that the genes are either sufficient or necessary in the strict sense.
Since epidemiological analysis is relativized explicitly to some population of interest, it is
entirely possible that what is practically sufficient in one population will not be in
another.

Practical sufficiency is thus a modification of our ordinary notion of

sufficiency to highly complex causal systems - it requires only that that the gene(s) be
necessary components of each set of sufficient conditions which can occur in the
population. PS is thus a more workable empirical notion of causal necessity and
sufficiency.
The main difficulty with PS is that, even though it is more practical and restricted than
sufficiency and necessity in the strict sense, it is still too strong to apply to the vast
majority of human diseases (this would likely be true even if we lowered the threshold
value to 95%). Its value for our purposes is thus mainly to anchor the endpoint of
epidemiological concepts of disease – it represents as strong a notion of causation as it is
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possible to generate using population-relative epidemiological analysis of complex causal
systems.
However, the goal is to develop a minimal notion of genetic disease. If we are to
preserve our two intuitions, any epidemiological concept must include both PEF and AR.
But what should the threshold value for each variable be? Clearly, it would have to be at
least 50%, as suggested by the use of the term “most” in our original intuitions.
Minimally Epidemiological (ME): A disease is classified as genetic whenever
both the Population Etiologic Fraction and the Attributable Risk exceed 50%.
If I refuse to sanction labeling a disease as genetic unless it has at least a 50% PEF and
a 50% AR, then I have insured that my intuitions are met. Most people with the disease
will have the disease because they have the gene and most people with the gene will
develop the disease because of the gene. We could, of course, require that the thresholds
be set higher than 50%. While I have no principled objection to this, it will be difficult to
defend any number other than 50% as anything other than arbitrary. Moreover, it will be
difficult enough to establish that current candidates for genetic disease status are
legitimate in a minimal sense.

V. Applying the Epidemiological Concept
“The more you know, the more you know you don't know.”
-Aristotle
Let’s attempt to fix the endpoints of the epidemiological continuum as it appears in
practice. On one end of the continuum we have diseases like obesity xviii. Obesity has
increasingly been described as a genetic condition, since several genes have recently been
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discovered that regulate body weight, at least in mice. In this case, we can safely say that
genes are 1) causally involved, 2) in principle manipulable and 3) practically sufficient
to induce obesity in certain populations of lab mice. Even in the mouse populations,
however, we do not have the data we would need to claim that the condition is genetic in
the ME sense. One reason for this, ironically, is that we do not know enough about
healthy mice. That is, we do not know the prevalence of the “obesity gene” among
normal weight mice, and thus can not accurately calculate AR. We also do not know
how many diseased mice lack the obesity gene, and thus can not calculate PEF precisely
either xix.
Of course, we could sample normal weight mice and diseased mice and at least estimate
these values in some rough sense, likely with enough accuracy to pass judgment on the
disease’s ME genetic status for populations of mice reared under “normal” protocols
(e.g., with diet and exercise held constant). However, in human populations, at least in
the affluent West, it seems highly unlikely that PEF for genes with respect to obesity will
exceed 50%. Although it is certainly interesting to find that genes can induce obesity,
these cases are only a small fraction of the causes of obesity. Other factors like diet
(which can not be controlled well in human populations, despite the best educational
efforts of our medical community) will have extremely high PEF values. Diet will
therefore almost certainly be singled out as the explanatory factor, contra genes, by any
reasonable causal selection scheme. According to the epidemiological account, then,
human obesity should not be classed as a genetic disease - genes do seem to play a role
here, even an important role, but they are not the predominant cause of obesity.
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At the other extreme, a condition like Klinefelter’s syndrome seems defensibly
genetic xx. Klinefelter’s is caused by the presence of more than one copy of the X
chromosome alongside a Y chromosome and results in numerous problems with the
development of sexual characteristics. Here, the genes seem Practically Sufficient (PS)
for the trait (AR and PEF of 100%). Again, of course, we will have difficulty supporting
this claim as strongly as we would like, since we do not really know if the relative
numbers of people with the genetic anomaly who fail to exhibit the condition or who
exhibit the condition for reasons other than their genes. However, in the case of entire
additional chromosomes and complex symptomologies, we have very sound theoretical
grounds to expect that very few people indeed will fall in these categories. At the very
least, it seems an excellent bet that Klinefelter’s syndrome will qualify as genetic in the
ME sense, and most likely in the PS sense as well.
Cystic fibrosis (CF) is a much more complex case. CF is associated with any of at least
300 different known mutations in the Cystic Fibrosis Transmembrane Conductance
Regulator (CFTR) gene. There is no clear relationship between the severity of symptoms
and specific mutations, and there are even cases where individuals with a CFTR mutation
do not have the disease(see Table 1). CF thus could not be classified as genetic in the PS
sense. Even on the ME account, the case is not perfectly clear. The PEF for the genes
(collectively, though not for any single mutation) is probably at or close to 100% - we
have, at least arguably, decent data here since it is not unusual for CF sufferers to be
tested for the gene. Again, however, the AR is simply not known, though we do know it
is definitely < 100%, since we know of individuals with the mutations who exhibit no
symptoms of the disease. This certainly should counsel caution in describing CF as
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genetic even in the ME sense. However, I would argue that it still seems a good bet
(though not an excellent one), given the fundamental function of the CFTR receptor in
the cell, that individuals with the mutations who manage to function normally are
relatively rare (and thus that AR is fairly high). But they need not be terribly rare - unless
these lucky individuals actually outnumber those with the gene and the disease, CF will
still qualify as genetic in the ME sense (AR > 50%).

VI. Relativity Considerations
“I am sorry that I have had to leave so many problems unsolved. I always have to
make this apology, but the world really is rather puzzling and I cannot help it.”
- Bertrand Russell
The epidemiological account is able to handle the complex and highly variable causal
systems we know to be operating in human disease, while also restricting itself to
questions of a decidable empirical nature. However, this advantageous arrangement does
come at a price – as an inherently statistical account, any epidemiological explanation of
a disease must be explicitly relativized to some particular population. There is no
guarantee that the explanation for a trait in one population will hold true for other
populations – indeed, there is often excellent reason to think that it will not xxi.
The population relativity of epidemiological explanations leads to a number of potential
worries. For one thing, it is not clear precisely how one is to choose the population in
question. There can be no answer to this other than a pragmatic one - the population
chosen must be one of sufficient interest to one’s audience. It is true that sometimes this
will result in a great many competing explanations for the same trait. While this is
certainly imperfect, it is clearly preferable to the alternative of a misleading uniformity.
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In any event, it is also true that we very often will have a clearly defined population in
mind when we create an explanation. The United States Department of Health, for
example, is primarily concerned with the explanation of diseases within the U.S.
population. Those still worried about relativism creeping into our explanations can take
solace from the fact that the population in question must at least be cited explicitly and
the rules for what counts as adequate within any population are well-defined. The
epidemiological account, therefore, hardly constitutes an “anything goes” abandonment
of objectivity.
It also might plausibly be objected that such an account of explanation is completely at
a loss when faced with the task of explaining individual occurrences of a trait xxii. For
example, if a patient insists on knowing what caused his particular case of cancer, it does
not help him very much to cite the relative prevalence of causal factors within the larger
population of which he is a part. This is indeed counter-intuitive, especially given the
focus of modern medicine on the care of individual patients. However, before taking this
criticism too far, we should consider whether or not there really is an alternative.
Recall the case of our causally omniscient alien physician: he knows everything there is
to know about the particular patient’s case, but nothing about the more general
population. If he really wanted to answer the patient’s question about his particular case
(other than by simply indicating the entire causal matrix), he would have only two
possible routes. First, he could engage in so-called counterfactual analysis, where one
tries to make projections about what would have happened in a particular case were the
circumstances different from what they actually are. This can become tortuous indeed –
as when modal logicians speak of an infinite series of possible worlds, similar in some
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but not all respects to our own, in an attempt to make sense of the semantics here. For
example, we might well wonder what life would be like in a possible world where Hitler
postponed the invasion of Soviet Russia until after the fall of Britain. When it comes to
causal analysis of disease in individual cases without any information from populations,
it is hard to see how this is more than raw speculation of a particularly fanciful kind.
The only other option left to the alien doctor would be to explicitly import populational
data. In a population, but not in an individual, there will be variation in causal factors. In
a large enough population, one can find almost any combination of relevant casual (risk)
factors. By crunching these numbers, we can calculate the actual risk of a particular
disease, given any set of initial conditions. In other words, populational data would allow
us to solve the problem - but only by cheating. We simply can not say much, if anything,
about the relative importance of causal factors if we rely only on the perspective of the
individual patient – the causal selection problem requires data from populations for its
resolution. To suggest, therefore, that reliance on populations is somehow a difficulty is
to imply endorsement of an impossible alternative. Without some, at least implicit,
appeal to population-level information such as which factors vary and in what way, there
are simply no grounds for causal selection, no matter what account one favors.
Thus, an account of causal selection which can explain individual cases is, strictly
speaking, impossible. Accounts other than the epidemiological one still use populational
information because they must, but they sneak it in the back door without ever being
clear about what they are doing. The result is a fuzzy and misleading analysis of the
problem. Seen in this light, the epidemiological requirement that the explanation be
relativized explicitly to a carefully delimited population is a virtue, not a vice.
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VII. Concluding Remarks
The concept of a genetic disease is neither well-developed nor generally defensible as it
is employed in the literature. There are very few attempts to make the criteria for causal
selection explicit in general, and almost none in the specific case of human disease. One
must reason backwards from the kinds of claims one finds in the literature to implicit
notions of causal selection, but the notions thus uncovered are not able to withstand the
harsh light of critical scrutiny. Rather, they owe their survival to their very ambiguity.
The epidemiological account of genetic traits is an analysis of genetic disease which is
both practical and theoretically defensible. This account avoids many of the criticisms
leveled against its rivals, while still preserving a use of “genetic trait” which is useful and
informative. However, we must apply it with great care. In particular, we must always
keep in mind that a great many traits, likely even a large majority, will not meet any
defensible criterion of genetic status. This is not a failure of the epidemiological account,
so much as an admission that the world of biological causation is far too complex and
varied to admit of simplistic categorization.
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TABLE 1: PERMUTATIONS OF DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA
AND DISEASE IN CYSTIC FIBROSIS

SWEAT

GENETIC
FREQUENCY

CLASSIC
SYMPTOMS

TEST

TEST

positive

positive

positive

positive

positive

negative

positive

negative

positive

common

positive

negative

negative

common

negative

positive

positive

negative

positive

negative

negative

negative

positive

unknown

negative

negative

negative

health

classic CF
occurs

occurs
occurs
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Table 2
DISEASE

NO DISEASE

TOTAL

DISEASE GENE

800

200

1000

NO DISEASE GENE

450

8550

9000

TOTAL

1250

8750

10000
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Table 3
DISEASE

NO DISEASE

TOTAL

760

0

760

40

200

240

NO DISEASE GENE

450

8,550

9,000

TOTAL

1,250

8,750

10,000

Gene present, causes
disease
Gene present, but not
cause of disease

Simple Etiologic Fraction = 760/800 = 95%
Population Etiologic Fraction = 760/1,250 = 61%
Attributable Risk 760/1,000 = 76%
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Table 4
DISEASE

NO DISEASE

TOTAL

1,000

0

1,000

100

1,050

1,150

NO DISEASE GENE

700

7,150

7,850

TOTAL

1,800

8,200

10,000

Gene present, causes
disease
Gene present, but not
cause of disease

Simple Etiologic Fraction = 1,000/1,100 = 91%
Population Etiologic Fraction = 1,000/1,800 = 56%
Attributable Risk = 1,000/2,150 = 47%
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Table 5
DISEASE

NO DISEASE

TOTAL

710

0

710

90

200

290

NO DISEASE GENE

2,000

7,000

9,000

TOTAL

2,800

7,200

10,000

Gene present, causes
disease
Gene present, but not
cause of disease

Simple Etiologic Fraction = 710/800 = 89%
Population Etiologic Fraction = 710/2,800 = 25%
Attributable Risk = 710/1,000 = 71%
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i

Indeed, one common complaint about the holistic approach to causal explanation is that

it becomes very difficult to limit the number of causal factors one is forced to consider,
and a kind of “galloping holism” threatens (Sterelney, et. al., 1996). In the extreme, for
example, one can make a case that all factors within the light cone of a particular
outcome may have to be included in a truly complete causal explanation.
ii

I revert to well-characterized situations like barn fires when it is important to minimize

the intuitive impact of our causal ignorance. One could in principle construct the same
sort of example with a disease, but our ignorance of the causal factors and their
importance will tend to lead the discussion away from causal selection and towards
causal connection issues.
iii

Mackie (1965, 1974) develops a precise vocabulary to discuss these relationships. The

application of fire to hay would be seen as an INUS factor: an Insufficient but
Unnecessary part of a set of conditions which is Unnecessary but Sufficient for the
effect. A set of INUS factors, which is jointly sufficient to bring about an effect, is called
a Minimally Sufficient Condition (MSC).
iv

Wulff (1984) offers an interesting discussion of the evolution of disease classification

away from symptomology and towards causal agency. It should be clear, however, that if
we define a disease in terms of the presence of some particular causal factor, then we
have already chosen a particular way to answer the causal selection question. This may
work very well for, say, infectious diseases. However, the coming genetic revolution is
likely to reveal major flaws in this approach as more and more asymptomatic people with
“disease genes” are discovered.
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v

To further complicate matters, questions of genetic disease are tied to misleading and

inappropriate conceptions of the nature and significance of genes – though this is not
often recognized (see Smith 1999).
vi

Even in those cases where the researchers are carefully circumspect, reporters covering

their work typically are not.
vii

It may be a bit unfair to show Koch as requiring strict sufficiency and necessity

through the use of “always” and “never” in the postulates. Whatever the historical
accuracy of this move, it serves to illustrate the poverty of such an approach when
applied to complex diseases. At a minimum, Koch’s approach would have to be
supplemented with another technique (which he does not provide) on pain of leaving the
causal selection to the whim of the researcher.
viii

Indeed, exposure to the TB bacillus used to be essentially universal before modern

public health measures were instituted in the Western world. Today, exposure to the
bacillus tends to be identified as the cause of TB, but in the 1940’s it would be more
accurate to identify differences in immunity rather than exposure as the culprit (Stern
1973).
ix

We have to be very careful not to overestimate the strength of the correlation. It is true

that all individuals with Huntington’s Chorea, for example, also have the characteristic
genetic anomaly. It does not follow from this, however, that all individuals with the
genetic anomaly have Huntington’s. We simply do not know how many asymptomatic
people have the gene in question. What is more, we will not find out with typical testing
procedures, which are directed only at those who are sick.
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x

These include abnormality analysis (Hart & Honore 1959, Hilton 1988), unexpected

conditions (Gardenfors 1980, van Fraassen 1980), precipitating causes (Ducasse 1924,
Ryle 1949), dispositional conditions (Nagel, 1961, Martin 1978), and instrumental
efficacy (Collingwood 1938). One of the most promising approaches is to develop a
notion of limited or practical sufficiency (Gifford 1990, Wulff 1984b) which I attempt to
incorporate in an explicit fashion in my own epidemiological account.
xi

Worse, there has been at least one unanticipated death which seems to have resulted

from gene therapy.
xii

Actually, this is a bit more complex than it seems here, but I will discuss this in the

specific cases later.
xiii

We must specify an explicit list of causal factors among which we will perform our

selection. Should it turn out later that we were unaware of some important causal factor,
for example, we will have to redo the analysis.
xiv

In fact, the reference population must have at least two subpopulations differing in the

trait in question. This is because the phenomenon actually being explained is the
variance in the trait between the two subpopulations, not the trait simplicitur.
xv

I am indebted to Henrik Wulff for much of the insight behind this categorization and

for greatly improving the precision of the numerical analysis which supports them.
xvi

See also Gifford 1990 and Wulff 1984b for similar attempts to develop a notion of

practical sufficiency.
xvii

Alternately, one might require both numbers to exceed some very high figure less than

100%, say 95%, as we do when calculating statistical significance. This would provide a
very strong notion of genetic causation without ruling out every possible exception.
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xviii

Of course, it is an open question as to whether a condition like obesity should really

qualify as a disease. It is not my intent to offer a general account of disease, so I will
simply assume for the purposes of argument here that it does.
xix

In fact, this sort of situation poses a major problem for any theoretically adequate

notion of disease causation. Studies to determine the actual incidence of disease genes in
healthy populations will be extremely expensive and may not be available for many years
to come.
xx

It has been suggested that perhaps Klinefelter’s is not a genetic disease at all, since it is

not heritable. People’s intuitions seem to differ widely on the importance of this point
and, in any event, my purpose is to develop a normative account rather than a descriptive
one. Unless it can be shown that some particular environmental factor routinely accounts
for the genetic changes, the epidemiological account will still describe the condition as
genetic.
xxi

In fact, this will be quite common with some traits: lactose intolerance is a genetic trait

for most populations in Western Europe and the U.S. (where consumption of milk
products is common), yet it is clearly environmental in many Asian countries. See also
Burian (1981-2) and Smith (1992) for a discussion of population-relativity in
phenylketonuria, as well as Stern’s (1973) analysis of tuberculosis.
xxii

This is because there is no variation within an individual with respect to the causal

factors to be analyzed.
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